Quality of Consumption: The Friendlier Side of Quality of Service by Kablan, Murad et al.
Quality of Consumption:
The Friendlier Side of Quality of Service
Murad Kablan† Hani Jamjoom‡ Eric Keller†
†University of Colorado ‡IBM Watson Research Center
Boulder, CO, USA Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
ABSTRACT
Cloud services today are increasingly built using functional-
ity from other running services. In this paper, we question
whether legacy Quality of Services (QoS) metrics and en-
forcement techniques are sufficient as they are producer cen-
tric. We argue that, similar to customer rating systems found
in banking systems and many sharing economy apps (e.g.,
Uber and Airbnb), Quality of Consumption (QoC) should
be introduced to capture different metrics about service con-
sumers. We show how the combination of QoS and QoC,
dubbed QoX, can be used by consumers and providers to
improve the security and management of their infrastructure.
In addition, we demonstrate how sharing information among
other consumers and providers increase the value of QoX. To
address the main challenge with sharing information, namely
sybil attacks and mis-information, we describe how we can
leverage cloud providers as vouching authorities to ensure
the integrity of information. We present initial results in
prototyping the appropriate abstractions and interfaces in a
cloud environment, focusing on the design impact on both
service providers and consumers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Building and deploying any distributed “app” today is rad-
ically different from a decade ago. Where traditional ap-
plications of the past required dedicated infrastructure and
middleware stacks, today’s apps not only run on shared—
cloud—infrastructure, they rely on many services, residing
within and outside of underlying cloud. An app, for example,
can use Facebook for authentication, Box for storage, Twilio
for messaging, Square for payments, Google AdSense for
advertising, etc. This trend of deploying and consuming ser-
vices (often referred to as the mesh economy) can be seen
by the rapid growth of cloud platforms which integrate ser-
vices (and not just compute) like Amazon Web Services [1],
Microsoft Azure [6], Heroku [3], IBM BlueMix [4], and
CloudFoundry [2], to name a few. More importantly, these
emerging platforms further encourage the developed apps to
expose their core capability as services to be consumed by
other services. The result is a growing ecosystem of interde-
pendent services that blur the traditional boundaries between
service producers and consumers.
In this paper, we revisit quality of service (QoS) abstrac-
tions and enforcement techniques in such environments. Specif-
ically, we observe that while QoS is the subject of much re-
search, it has been primarily provider centric. For example,
QoS for video streaming looks at the quality of provider’s
video and how it is impacted by bandwidth, latency, jitter,
etc. This unidirectional view has dominated the design of
past QoS abstractions and enforcement techniques. Even to-
day, most cloud services continue to design their APIs around
static entitlement buckets (e.g., free clients are allowed 100
calls per minutes and registered users are allowed 1000 calls
per minute). If viewed as a directed graph,1 current QoS
models focus on either a single interaction between a pro-
ducer and consumer (e.g., rate limits) or producer and many
consumers (e.g., DoS protection). In this paper, we study
how interactions among all producers and consumers can be
leveraged to the general benefit of everyone.
Thinking of the problem space from an ecosystem per-
spective creates new opportunities for improving both ser-
vice production and consumption. In this new environment,
better service production is encouraged. Similarly, better ser-
vice consumption is rewarded. Finally, poorly implemented
services and malicious clients are isolated. Achieving this
vision requires questioning the unidirectionality of QoS de-
signs. In particular, we introduce Quality of Consumption
(QoC) to refer to metrics that can be captured to define at-
tributes of how a consumer is using a service. The idea of
QoC is not new in the real world. Lending (e.g, mortgage and
credit cards) are dependent on the ratings of the customers.
Customers (credit consumers) who demonstrate consistent
repayment of loans have improved FIMCO scores; this, in
turn results in higher future credit limits.
In most real systems, both QoS and QoC are needed. Re-
cent startups in the sharing economy space, like Uber and
Airbib, demonstrate how quality of the providers and con-
sumers can be leveraged to enable trust between all parties.
We use the term QoX to capture systems that integrate both
QoS and QoC. Conceptually, there are then three import com-
ponents to QoX environments: (C1) providers’ QoS are mon-
itored and rated, (C2) consumers’ QoC are similarly tracked,
1In such graph, service producers and consumers are represented
as nodes, and consumption from a producer to a consumer is repre-
sented as a directed edge
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Dimension Metrics
Performance Throughput, Packet loss probability, re-
sponse time, jitter
Dependability Reliability (e.g., maximum number of
crashes or interruption), availability (e.g.,
maximum number the service will be un-
available)
Cost Prices and rates
Table 1: QoS metrics of Cloud services
and (C3) this information is shared among providers and
consumers and is used in provider selection and service dif-
ferentiation.
In this paper, we show how a similar setup can be achieved
in cloud environments. Specifically, we look at how to ex-
tend existing QoS frameworks to support QoC. This is to
support C1 and C2 above. Furthermore, we also look at how
to use cloud providers as vouching authorities to achieve C3,
even in the presence of sybils and liers. We present initial
thoughts on the appropriate abstractions and interfaces to ad-
dress them on a cloud based framework that manages and
define the quality of interaction and service from both con-
sumer and provider’s perspectives. We explore the motiva-
tions, challenges, and potentials to introduce such a frame-
work in the cloud environment.
2. DEFINING QUALITY
In this section, we introduce the term Quality of Consump-
tion (QoC) as a counterpart to the Quality of Service (QoS)
metrics. Both can be readily measured (latency, bandwidth,
etc.) and can be specified as part of SLAs. We define QoS
and QoC. We also describe the needed components to enable
QoX in cloud environments.
Quality of Service (QoS). QoS can be defined as a measur-
able level of service delivered to its users’satisfaction. QoS
of cloud services can be characterized across multiple di-
mensions, each having a set of metrics (Table 1). For exam-
ple, the quality of a database service, such as ClearDB[?],
can be measured by its dependability (availability) and per-
formance (response time for SQL request). While the quality
of an ad service such as Adobe Ad[?] can be measured by
its rate.
Quality of Consumption (QoC). QoC captures how well
users are consuming a service. It can be used by service
providers to assist in admission control decisions or when
providing service differentiation. QoC is a way to recognize
that service consumers are not equal. To some extent, QoC
monitoring already exists (e.g., intrusion detection and pre-
vention systems). These are point solutions. The problem
is that there is no abstraction or framework for cloud service
providers to collect various QoC metrics and then translate
them to suitable actions. Similar to QoS, QoC can be char-
acterized across multiple dimensions, each having a set of
metrics (Table 2).
QoX = QoS + QoC. We use the abbreviation QoX to cap-
Dimension Metrics
Customer pur-
chase power
Length existing as a user, frequency of or-
ders, amount of purchases
Customer’s
code efficiency
Version of software customer is running,
malformed requests (e.g., Web server error
logs)
Customer
threat
IDS alerts. Service crash reports
Table 2: QoC metrics of Cloud services
ture the combination of QoS and QoC. As illustrated in Fig-
ure 1, through measurement systems and other system logs,
consumers and providers capture quality metrics about each
other (e.g., via an IDS or other resource monitors), captured
in the box labeled information about service provider(s) or
consumer(s) – indicating it is available, not necessarily stored.
Collectively, this information is interpreted as QoX, and can
be used, either directly or indirectly, in managing the infras-
tructures operation, both at run-time and during initializa-
tion. We discuss the details of implementation and integra-
tion in Section 5.
3. DEMOCRATIZATION AND SHARING OF
QOX
In sharing information, consumers and providers can gain
the benefit of others’ experiences. This can be useful, for
example, when choosing a service provider, or knowing that
certain consumers are likely to pose security threats. Even
more, this information can be used for self-feedback. In
traditional infrastructures, the administrator has visibility of
what is happening inside of the infrastructure through a va-
riety of monitoring tools. The administrator, however, has
limited visibility into how the infrastructure is viewed ex-
ternally. Sentiment analysis is widely used in corporations
(e.g., monitor Twitter feeds to observe whether there is any
positive or negative chatter affecting its brand [11, 8]). With
an information exchange system, a provider (or consumer)
can monitor its sentiment as perceived by its consumers (or
providers), and trigger a root cause analysis if there are any
negative issues.
Illustrated in Figure 2 is an ecosystem of consumers and
providers, all interacting with one another (forming a system
of engagement [?]), and exchanging the information. The
information about a service (or consumer), previously illus-
trated in Figure 1, is shared with a logical service labeled in-
formation exchange. In the remainder of the section, we dis-
cuss the two main types of information. The first summarizes
information about the interaction as a whole; the second is a
record of a specific interaction. We address the challenges of
dealing with lying and sybils in Section 4.
3.1 Summary of Engagement
The challenge in simply exchanging the information about
a provider (or consumer) is there is no clear, standardized
way to compare quantifiable metrics across providers and
consumers. Even simple and as well-defined metrics such
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Figure 1: Interpretation of measured information as quality of service or quality of consumption.
as latency can be subjective (e.g., due to network proximity).
Instead, we are inspired by review systems found in web sites
such as Yelp (for restaurants) and Amazon (for products).
In this case, consumers and providers share a scalar, subjec-
tive rating of quality coupled with a (machine generated) text
based review.
3.1.1 Scalar, Subjective Rating
The summarization rating is scalar (as opposed to just good
or bad) as there are many factors that go into overall quality,
and subjective to account for the wide variety of metrics and
needs of various providers or consumers. This rating repre-
sents the current view, with the weighting of history versus
recent experiences left to the rater. A key challenge is de-
termining the rating. As illustrated in Figure 2, we envision
that each consumer and provider will have software which
interprets the information about a consumer or provider to ul-
timately determine the rating . The administrator configures
how this interpreter behaves. This is a long term challenge—
creating a language to enable administrators on either side to
integrate with the measurement systems, being able to spec-
ify expectations, and how each component impacts the over-
all rating. For initial exploration, we can provide thresholds
for specific metrics, or simply let the human administrators
provide a rating.
In Section 5, we will briefly discuss how consumers and
providers can use QoX information to help automatically
manage their infrastructure (e.g., load balancing or priori-
tization based on QoC). Having the shared information can
strengthen the confidence in those actions, but also opens
some additional avenues for the specific case of a given con-
sumer and provider having not had interaction before. On the
consumer side, the shared information can support the con-
sumer in making a decision about which service provider to
use. On the service provider side, the shared information can
support the provider in offering incentives to use a service or
introducing restrictions in use.
3.1.2 Text review to Help Interpret the Rating
A coarse-grained rating has the benefit that it can be used
in any context. The downside, however, is that it hides poten-
tially useful information (e.g., information about why a par-
ticular reviewer gave the rating they did). This introduces a
challenge in interpreting the rating. Using a restaurant exam-
ple, consider a restaurant that has several 2-star ratings and
several 5-star ratings. The 2-star ratings ultimately reflect
that those diners really value authenticity, and this restau-
rant was not authentic enough, whereas the 5-star ratings
ultimately reflect that while it might not be really authen-
tic, the food is tasty and the restaurant is really clean and
has friendly staff. This distinction cannot be captured with a
coarse rating.
One approach to getting around this is to use sub-categories,
though this has notable downside of determining the sub-
categories requires forecasting every single criteria that might
be used—an impossible task. In practice, a small set of sub-
categories is useful (e.g., Home Depot has quality and value
in addition to overall rating, to help separate all metrics re-
lated to the product and metrics related to the cost), but hav-
ing too many will inevitably require standardization.
Instead, we propose including machine-generated text based
reviews to go along with the rating. This will allow each re-
viewer the means to specify why they gave the rating, and
each user of a review to find whether the rating reflects its
needs. Clearly, text-based reviews are helpful for human ad-
minstrators if they want to view the ratings, but we believe
text reviews can also help guide automated systems as well.
Through systems (such as Elastic Search) which extract
structure from unstructured data and provide analysis, we
believe that it will be possible to extract the commonalities
among reviews – that is, automatically creating sub-categories
that are relevant for that particular provider or consumer.
Amazon does this for product reviews as they highlight com-
mon comments.
Creating these machine-generated text reviews is not a sig-
nificant challenge as they can be built out of specific log text,
and based on the administrators configuration of the QoX in-
terpreter. Configuring the infrastructure to search for spe-
cific information will require some administrative effort ini-
tially, to understand, generally, what the commonalities are
Summary Rating
(Example as text)
“RTT varies”
“Consumer has not 
updated SW”
e.g., IDS alerted of 
DDoS attack
[info]
Interactions
(System of Engagement) QoC InterpreterQoS Interpreter
Info about service 
provider(s)
Info about service 
consumer(s)
Record of EventSummary of Exchange
Information Exchange
Configure Configure
Figure 2: Illustration of information exchange
and then building that into the configuration for how to use
the ratings as they are adjusted overtime.
3.1.3 Personalization without Connections
In other information exchange systems, there have been
proposals to leverage social structure to provide more rel-
evant information. For example, in a system which rates
restaurants, any reviews from friends would be more trust-
ed/valued and more useful/relevant. In short, personaliza-
tion arranges the presentation of, filters, and interprets the
information to be most relevant to the requester of the infor-
mation.
We believe the same is true for cloud services, except, of
course, there is no notion of friends among service providers
or consumers. Previous attempts [10] have extracted such
a ‘social’ structure by way of interactions. This, however,
requires a fairly connected graph. Whereas, the consumer-
provider graph is likely to be mostly a bi-partite graph.2
Instead, we can perform personalization by leveraging tech-
niques used by recommendation engines. In recommenda-
tion systems, the goal is to predict a choice (e.g., what movie
to watch) based on others with like characteristics (e.g., who
have watched similar movies). That is, they find connections
between unconnected users using machine learning techniques
(e.g., PredictionIO [?]).
Our goal is not to make a recommendation, but to high-
light reviews that are particularly relevant. The challenge is
identifying relevant features. This may include examining
consumers who use a similar set of services, or who uses a
similar set of API calls for a given service. This is an area
for future research.
3.2 Exchanging Specific Records
Ultimately, exchanging summary of exchange information
2This is also a challenge we highlighted in using existing sybil at-
tack prevention approaches.
will capture a scalar rating of different metrics about con-
sumers and providers. While ratings, even detailed ratings,
have value in making coarse decisions, some information
that an individual consumer or provider records would help
others if shared. This is specifically evident in securing an
infrastructure. At a high level, consider the possibilities if
each service provider share their intrusion detection system
(IDS) logs and alerts. Now, all providers could get the benefit
of a ‘global IDS’, allowing them to protect themselves even
before seeing an attack and even if they didn’t have their own
ability to detect a given attack.
As a specific example, in 2014, hackers exploited a bug
in the Amazon EC2 API to gain access to other tenants’
accounts and then flood other servers with UDP packets to
cause a denial of service [7, 14]. Providers sharing alerts
of the attack, can greatly reduce the damage to services by
warning others of potential threats, allowing them to, for ex-
ample, block that particular tenant. Note that in this example,
while it may not prevent the attack from successfully deny-
ing service for the first tenant attacked, it generally helped
others (making it valuable), and there are a larger set of sit-
uations where everybody benefits – specifically in detecting,
and comparing, reconnaissance efforts of potential attackers.
4. CLOUD PROVIDER AS VOUCHING AU-
THORITY
A key challenge arises when dealing with any sharing is
ensuring the validity of information. As we move toward an
entirely cloud based infrastructure—both IaaS and PaaS—
we believe that an opportunity to overcome these challenges
becomes possible, where the cloud provider serves as a vouch-
ing authority. We elaborate on two ways by which validity of
information can be compromised, and the role of the cloud
provider in each.
4.1 Fake Identities
In Section 3, we proposed that each consumer or provider
can rate the other party for which they have had an interac-
tion with. In an ideal world, quality is computed by equally
weighting everyone’s opinion (e.g., via average rating). In
reality, reviewers can create fake identities, also know as the
sybil attack [?]. For example, if a service provider were able
to create a substantial number of fake entities that then rate
its service as high quality, that service provider’s rating will
be unnaturally high. The inverse is possible, where a com-
petitor that wants to negatively influence another provider’s
rating. There are a number of prevention techniques [?, ?]
that have been designed for decentralized (peer-to-peer) sys-
tems. These will not work here as each relies on a trust graph
(e.g., a social network graph) in determining the likelihood
that an entity is real and limiting the influence the collection
of sybils can have. Such graph does not exist here.
Fortunately, these are not necessary for cloud based inter-
actions as we have a central authority: the cloud provider.
The cloud provider can vouch for the identity is real and
unique. It is much more challenging to create fake accounts
where identity verification is required, such as requiring a
credit card (as Amazon does). While it may be possible for
a small-scale attack by creating a few accounts (with a few
credit cards), overall this prevention mechanism is sufficient
if the cloud provider can vouch [?]
4.2 Providing mis-information
While having the cloud provider vouch for an identity pre-
vents sybil attacks, real parties can provide false informa-
tion. Here, we propose that the cloud provider can, to some
degree, vouch for the validity of information based on the
visibility the cloud provider has.
Did the reviewer actually interact with the reviewee? Gen-
erally, we can rely on the crowd to deal with any lying, as a
single rating will be noise in the overall rating. For example,
if everyone is giving a service or consumer 5 stars except for
its main rival, then not only will that rating have little ability
to influence the overall score, but it might stand out and hurt
the party giving that low rating. However, it is still desirable
to restrict the ability to rate parties that one has not interacted
with, to prevent collusion or compromises in some accounts.
An IaaS provider has visibility into the network infrastruc-
ture, so can, for example, see whether the tenants exchanged
at least a certain number of packets. An PaaS provider, such
as running CloudFoundry [2], brokers the interconnection
between service provider and consumer, so has the ability
to indicate if a connection was actually made.
Can the information be trusted enough to act on imme-
diately? Some information would cause immediate, auto-
mated action and as such lying can have a negative impact.
Consider one service provider detecting the start of some at-
tack (e.g., a DoS attack), sharing this information with an-
other provider will help them, say block that user. If they are
able to lie about it, they can cause another service provider
to block a consumer unnecessarily. So, the receiver of the
information needs to ensure the information is accurate.
Again, the visibility the cloud provider has can be lever-
aged to validate certain information. Of course, this is a
greater challenge to deal with than simply determining if two
parties interacted. The challenge lies in the variety of infor-
mation that can be shared. Each will have different char-
acteristics which will serve as evidence (e.g., if one tenant
wishes to share that another tenant performed a port scan,
then the cloud provider needs enough evidence to verify that
occurred). For this, we envision the tenant pre-specifying
evidence patterns, which will specify the evidence that the
tenant would like the cloud provider to collect. We envision
measurable information such as bursts of traffic, crashes, spe-
cific IP address did indeed send something to another IP ad-
dress, and not performing deep packet inspection, but this is
an area for future investigation.
5. INITIAL PROTOTYPE
As an initial proof-of-concept prototype, we focus on demon-
strating the feasibility of integration with existing systems
and applications. Integration should not require substantial
development efforts. Similar to service life cycle calls in
PaaS clouds [2], we must define simple, yet generic inter-
faces that can be easily implemented by service providers.
In particular, we prototyped the QoX interpreter aspect il-
lustrated in Figure 2 (outbound logic), though the actual im-
plementation is a decentralized one, and in a similar way,
integrate into existing systems to use the rating and perform
certain actions (inbound logic), including the special case of
monitoring one’s own rating.
The Quality Interpreter is implemented as a set of light
weight process that interact with interfaces of other com-
ponents. It can be configured with a text configuration file
that specifies the following: (i) a list of components, each
of which has the name of the component, IP, type (service,
executor, sensor), component description and its tasks; (ii) a
mapping table that maps monitors feedback to list of actions.
5.1 Outbound logic
The outbound logic extracts and collects information from
alerts, events, and status updates from the sensors and sends
this information to the Quality Interpreter for translation into
a rating.
Intrusion Detection System: An intrusion detection sys-
tem (IDS) monitors network traffic and looks for signatures
within packets or performs behavioral analysis of the traffic
to detect anomalies. In this case, the shim’s outbound logic
is designed to intercept the alerts from the IDS, and allow
service providers to configure the feedback weights for each
alert type. We integrated a shim interface to Snort [15]. Snort
alerts are configured to log to Syslog. By using SWATCH [16]
to monitor Syslog, the shim is alerted to all Snort alerts. The
shim parses the alerts and extracts information such as source
IP and alert type and send the feedback to the Quality Inter-
preter.
5.2 Inbound logic
The shim’s inbound logic interprets how incoming ratings
should impact the execution of the component.
Load Balancer: In Web services, load balancers are used
to distribute client load across identical instances of the ser-
vice. Typically, load balancers aim for even distribution [5].
With rating information obtained through the informaiton
exchange, the web service provider can differentiate its users
based on their (expected) QoC, directing good/trusted clients
to a set of servers, and bad/untrusted clients to a different set
of servers. We integrated a shim interface with HAProxy
load balancer. This shim alters the configurations written
in a haproxy.cfg file to specify load balancing based on the
rating of consumer. Upon every change, the shim will tell
HAProxy to reload the configuration.
Paas Broker PaaS clouds offer the ability to compose ap-
plications using services provided by the platform. In some
cases, a PaaS cloud provides all of the services (e.g., Mi-
crosoft Azure [6]). In other cases, platforms, such as Cloud-
Foundry [2], provide an environment where many service
providers can offer their services.
Service consumers use a broker to (1) discover services
and (2) bind to them. Service discovery, in general, im-
plements a simple search capability, focusing on returning
one-to-one match with the needed service (e.g., version 2.6
of MongoDB). We extended the CloudFoundry client-side
broker interface to enrich and filter the results. Whenever a
search request arrives at the broker, the integrated interface
would interpose on the request and queries the information
exchange service to get rating of the searched services; the
inbound logic would then sort and filter the results based on
user-defined criteria – i.e., configured to filter out any ser-
vices that would have low rating, and sort the remaining re-
sults based on rating.
5.3 Ratings Monitor
Sentiment Monitor: Infrastructure monitoring tools tradi-
tionally present information about the infrastructure to the
administrators – while this could be used for outbound logic,
we look at this as an interface to monitor the ratings in the
information exchange system. Monitoring can be used as
a way to alert administrators of changes in their service’s
rating. This would be implemented in the shim’s inbound
logic. We took advantage of JNRPE (Java Nagios Remote
Plugin Executor) [12] to build a Java plugin that is listen-
ing for ratings changes, and displays this sentiment and con-
figures alerts for when sentiment (collective metrics of the
service provider running Nagios) drop.
6. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT EVALUATION
As an example to demonstrate the tangible benefits for
sharing information, we focus on sharing information about
service providers and how this incentivizes services providers
to provide good service. We emulated a typical cloud envi-
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ronment, using Mininet [13], along with the CloudFoundry
integration. For this, The service consumer will choose among
services that have the highest quality of service. To distin-
guish between service providers, we use four discrete rating
values – 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 (higher is better). The service
consumer will choose among the top results with some prob-
ability distribution (1st search result chosen 85% of the time,
2nd result 10% of the time, 3rd result 5% of the time). As
shown in Figure 3, the expected benefits hold. As tenants
with the greatest tenant quality (0.8) had a greater revenue,
while tenants with lowest tenant quality had the least rev-
enue.
7. CONCLUSION
We presented initial thoughts on including quality of con-
sumption and quality of service in cloud-based services. We
discussed the major challenges that arise when representing
and controlling the interactions among service providers and
consumers. With the proliferation of specialized services and
a growing number of applications, we need to go beyond
simply measuring and reacting, but to share the information
with other consumers or providers. We also discussed how to
leverage the (IaaS or PaaS) cloud provider as a vouching au-
thority to deal with sybils and lying. Further, we showed that
the feasibility of integrating QoX in cloud-based services.
As this is preliminary, there is much to do. We presented
an overarching vision of measuring and sharing QoX infor-
mation, but were only able to prove out a subset. As fu-
ture work, we plan to investigate and research a number of
challenges, such as (i) a general specification language for
the interpreting QoX information such that it can feed into
the rating system and be used to guide automatic use of rat-
ings to configure executors (our initial interpreter is very ba-
sic), (ii) extend the interpreter by using processing systems
to extract structure from unstructured text reviews such that
we can automatically incorporate the finer grained details of
those reviews, (iii) perform a more in-depth study of service
and consumer features to enable automated personalization
of results, and (iv) explore the additional information a cloud
provider can measure such that it can be used to verify a
record of event, without specifically looking for that event.
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